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Abstract. This paper derives two characterizations of the KrepsWilson concept of consistent beliefs. In the first, beliefs are shown
to be consistent iff they can be constructed from the elements of
monomial vectors which converge to the strategies. In the second,
beliefs are shown to be consistent iff they can be induced by a
product dispersion whose marginal dispersions induce the strategies. The first characterization is simpler than the definition in
Kreps and Wilson (1982), and the second seems more fundamental in the sense that it is built on an underlying theory of relative
probability.

1. Introduction
This paper will draw extensively from Kreps and Wilson (1982)
(henceforth KW). KW’s definition of sequential equilibrium includes
the definition of consistency, and that definition says that beliefs and
strategies are consistent with one another iff they are the limit of a
sequence of strictly positive beliefs and strategies which are consistent
with one another via Bayes Rule. This paper provides two characterizations of this important definition.
The first characterization (Theorem 2.1) says that beliefs and strategies are consistent iff there are monomial vectors such that (a) the
strategy at each information set is the limit of the monomial vector
at that information set, and (b) the belief at each information set is
found by calculating the product of the monomials along the paths
leading to each of the nodes in the information set. This simplifies
the KW definition because each action is assigned a monomial (i.e., a
I thank Val Lambson, and the University of Auckland Economics Department
for its hospitality during my sabbatical.
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coefficient and an exponent) rather than a sequence (which is infinitedimensional). Streufert (2006b) uses the theorem to repair a nontrivial
fallacy in KW’s proofs, and Subsection 2.2 discusses how it extends a
result in Perea y Monsuwe, Jansen, and Peters (1997).
The second characterization (Theorem 3.1) is very disaggregated. It
concerns the Cartesian product of the action sets across the many information sets, together with an additional dimension for the initial
nodes. The theorem says that beliefs and strategies are consistent iff
there is a product dispersion over this Cartesian product such that (a1)
the exogenous distribution across the initial nodes is induced by the
corresponding marginal of the product, (a2) the strategy at each information set is induced by the corresponding marginal of the product,
and (b) the belief at each information set is induced by the restriction of
the product to those elements of the Cartesian product that correspond
to the information set. In my eyes, this construction is fundamental:
it is unaffected by arbitrary choices of sequences or monomials, and is
instead based upon a theory of relative probability (Streufert (2006a)).
Subsection 3.5 discusses how the construction stems from Kohlberg and
Reny (1997) and how it relates to Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
These two characterizations are derived simultaneously (Theorem
4.1). This is surprising because the two characterizations appear to
depart from the KW definition in opposite directions: the first uses
monomial vectors to reduce complexity while the second uses large
product dispersions that seem to increase complexity. Yet, the two
are directly linked via an underlying result in Streufert (2006a) which
shows that a dispersion can be represented by a product of monomial
vectors iff it is a product dispersion.
2. Characterization by Monomials
2.1. Basic Definitions
Section 2 uses KW notation. This subsection recapitulates certain
KW definitions and introduces an example which will be used throughout the paper.
This paragraph and Figure 2.1 define a game form [T, ≺, A, α, H, ρ].
The set T of nodes contains the set X = {o, oL, oLd, oR} of decision
nodes, which in turn contains the set W = {o} of initial nodes. The set
W is given the trivial distribution ρ = (ρ(o)) = (1), and the set X is
partitioned by the information sets h ∈ H = {{o}, {oL}, {oLd, oR}}.
Let H(x) denote the information set h which contains x. Finally, let
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Figure 2.1
A = {L, D, R, `, d, f, g} be the set of actions a, let A(h) be the set of
actions available from information set h, and let α(x) be the last action
taken to reach a non-initial node x.
A strategy profile is a function π:A→[0, 1] such that (∀h) Σa∈A(h) π(a)
= 1 (we assume perfect recall and consider only behavioural strategies).
A belief system is a function µ:X→[0, 1] such that (∀h) Σx∈h µ(x) = 1.
An assessment is a pair (π, µ). Let Ψ 0 consist of those strictly positive
assessments which satisfy
`(x)−1

(1)

(∀x) µ(x) =

ρ◦p`(x) (x)·Πk=0 π◦α◦pk (x)
`(x0 )−1

Σx0 ∈H(x) ρ◦p`(x0 ) (x0 )·Πk=0

π◦α◦pk (x0 )

,

where pk (x) is the kth predecessor of node x, and `(x) is the number
of its predecessors. An assessment (µ, π) is said to be consistent if it is
the limit of a sequence h(µn , π n )in in Ψ 0 . For instance, in the example,
the (π, µ) defined by the second lines of
(2)

n

π (a)
π(a)

L

D

R

`

d

n−1
1+3n−1

2n−1
1+3n−1

1
1+3n−1

1
1+6n−2

6n−2
1+6n−2

0

0

1

1

0

f g
1
2
1
2

1
2
1
2
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(3)

and

o oL
µ (x) 1 1
µ(x) 1 1
n

oLd

oD

6n−3
2n−1 +6n−3

2n−1
2n−1 +6n−3

0

1

is consistent because the second line in each table is the limit of its first
line, and because the (π n , µn ) defined in the first line of both tables is
within Ψ 0 for any value of n.
2.2. Theorem
Theorem 2.1 characterizes consistency by means of two functions
defined over the set A of actions. The function e assigns an integer
“exponent” to each action, and the function c assigns a positive real
“coefficient” to each action. This is simpler than the KW definition
because two functions of A are simpler than a sequence of functions of
A.
Theorem 2.1. In any game form [T, ≺, A, α, ρ, H], an assessment
(µ, π) is consistent iff there exists c:A→(0, ∞) and e:A→Z such that
(∀a) π(a) = limn→∞ c(a)ne(a) , and
`(x)−1

(∀x) µ(x) = limn→∞

ρ◦p` (x)·Πk=0 c◦α◦pk (x)ne◦α◦pk (x)
`(x0 )−1

Σx0 ∈H(x) ρ◦`(x0 )·Πk=0

c◦α◦pk (x0 )ne◦α◦pk (x0 )

.

Proof. Theorem 4.1(b⇔c) by means of the notational modifications
around (7) and (8).
2
Theorem 2.1 is equivalent to a reformulation of Lemmas A1 and
A2 on KW pages 887 and 888. Nonetheless, Theorem 2.1 is valuable
because it repairs a nontrivial fallacy in KW’s proof of these lemmas
(details in Streufert (2006b)), and because these lemmas in turn provide
the logical basis for KW’s three theorems about the geometry of the
set of sequential equilibrium assessments, the finiteness of the set of
sequential equilibrium outcomes, and the perfection of strict sequential
equilibria. The paper by Perea y Monsuwe, Jansen, and Peters (1997)
appears to recognize neither its close relation to the KW lemmas nor
the fallacy in the KW proof, and its Theorem 3.1 is weaker than the
KW lemmas to the extent that it derives the analog of real but not
necessarily integer exponents (details in Appendix A).
The functions c and e can be together regarded as a single function
which assigns a monomial c(a)ne(a) to each action a. For instance, the
first line in the following table defines a monomial at each action in the
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Figure 2.2
example
(4)

a
L
D R `
d
f g
c(a)ne(a) n−1 2n−1 1 1 6n−2 .5 .5 .
π(a)
0
0
1 1
0
.5 .5

The second line is then the strategy derived via the Theorem 2.1’s first
equation.
The theorem’s second equation asks one to calculate a product at
each node. Fortunately, this product is just the product of the monomials along the path leading to the node. For instance, in Figure 2.2,
the unboxed monomial at each action is taken from the first line of (4)
and the boxed monomial at each node is the product of the unboxed
monomials above it. These boxed monomials appear in the first line of
(5)

x
o oL oLd oD
`(x)−1
ρ◦p`(x) (x)·Πk=0 c◦α◦pk (x)ne◦α◦pk (x) 1 n−1 6n−3 2n−1 .
µ(x)
1 1
0
1

The second line is then the belief derived via the theorem’s second
equation.
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By Theorem 2.1, the assessment (π, µ) defined in (4) and (5) is consistent. This is rather uninteresting because (4) and (5) are very similar
to (2) and (3). In fact, it is always the case that the monomials defined
by c and e determine a special kind of sequence hπ n in by means of
c(a)ne(a)
.
(∀h)(∀a∈A(h)) π (a) =
Σa0 ∈A(h) c(a0 )ne(a0 )
n

However, the converse provided by Theorem 2.1 is valuable. It shows
that any consistent assessment can be supported with this special kind
of sequence.
The following corollary is equivalent to Theorem 2.1. In both the
theorem and the corollary, the first equation uses the exponents to
determine the support of the strategy at each h and then uses the coefficients to determine the probabilities over that support. Similarly, the
second equation uses the exponents to determine the support of the
belief at each h and then uses the coefficients to determine the probabilities over that support. The corollary’s formulation makes these
observations more apparent.
Corollary 2.2. In any game form [T, ≺, A, α, ρ, H], an assessment
(µ, π) is consistent iff there exists c:A→(0, ∞) and e:A→Z such that
(∀a) e(a) ≤ 0,


c(a) if e(a) = 0
, and
(∀a) π(a) =
0 if e(a) < 0


`(x)−1
ρ◦p`(x) (x)·Πk=0 c◦α◦pk (x)
if x∈H e (x) 

`(x)−1
0
0
(∀x) µ(x) =  Σx0 ∈H e (x) ρ◦p`(x0 ) (x )·Πk=0 c◦α◦pk (x )

0

`(x0 )−1

if x6∈H e (x)

where H e (x) = argmax{ Σk=0 e◦α◦pk (x0 ) | x0 ∈H(x) }.
Proof. The first equation of Theorem 2.1 is equivalent to the nonpositivity of e and the first equation of Corollary 2.2. The second equations
of the two results are equivalent.
2
3. Characterization by Product Dispersions

3.1. Modified Basic Notation
The remainder of this paper will use the modified notation that is
introduced in Table 3.1. The big picture is that Theorems 3.1 and 4.1
are best understood in terms of vectors of the form [xi ] and matrices
of the form [xij ].
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KW and Sections
Section 2 3 and 4
h
h
information set
a node in h
xh
the set of decision nodes
X
a decision node
x
µ|h
a belief at h
[µxh ]
a belief system
µ
([µxh ])h
the set of actions at h
A(h)
Ah
an action at h
ah
the set of actions
A
an action
a
[πah ]
a strategy at h
π|A(h)
a strategy profile
π
([πah ])h
Table 3.1
In addition, we will frequently need to derive a distribution from
a vector of functions. Specifically, let Z be a finite set, let [νz ] be a
distribution over Z, and let [fz (n)] be a vector over Z of functions fz (n)
of n. Then say that [νz ] is induced by [fz (n)] if
fz (n)
.
Σz0 fz0 (n)
To exercise this new notation and terminology, note that the assessment ([πah ])h , ([µxh ])h is consistent (as defined near (1)) iff there exists
a profile (h[πanh ]in )h of full-support distribution sequences h[πanh ]in such
that
(6)

(∀z) νz = limn→∞

(7)

(∀h) [πah ] = limn→∞ [πanh ] and
`(x)−1

n
(∀h) [µxh ] is induced by [ρp` (xh ) ·Πk=0 πα◦p
],
k (xh )

and that by Theorem 1, this is equivalent to the existence of a profile
([cah neah ])h of monomial vectors [cah neah ] such that
(8)

(∀h) [πah ] = limn→∞ [cah neah ] and
`(x)−1

(∀h) [µxh ] is induced by [ρp` (xh ) ·Πk=0 cα◦pk (xh ) neα◦pk (xh ) ] .
3.2. Dispersions
Streufert (2005, Section 2) introduces dispersions. Here is a brief
2
synopsis. Consider any finite set Z. A table over Z is a [qz/z0 ] ∈ [0, ∞]Z
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which lists a relative probability qz/z0 ∈ [0, ∞] for every pair of elements
z and z 0 from Z. A dispersion over Z is a table [qz/z0 ] that satisfies
(∀z) qz/z = 1 and
(∀z, z 0 , z 00 ) qz/z00 ∈ (qz/z0 , qz0 /z00 ) ,

in which  is a set-valued function assigning subsets of [0, ∞] to pairs
(u, v) ∈ [0, ∞]2 according to the rule


[0, ∞] if (u, v) equals (0, ∞) or (∞, 0)
.
(u, v) =
{uv}
otherwise
A dispersion [qz/z0 ] induces the distribution [νz ] satisfying
qz/z∗
(∀z) νz =
(9)
,
Σz0 ∈Z qz0 /z∗

for some z ∗ ∈Z satisfying (∀z 0 ∈Z) qz0 /z∗ < ∞. In other words a dispersion induces the distribution that is derived by normalizing any
“row” of the dispersion that contains only finite relative probabilities.
Streufert (2005, Remark 2.1) shows that every dispersion induces exactly one distribution.
3.3. Products
Streufert (2005, Section 3) and Streufert (2006a, Section 2) introduce
products over a nonempty finite collection (Zi )`i=1 of nonempty finite
sets Zi . A product over (Zi )`i=1 is table over the Cartesian product
`
Z = Πi=1
Zi which belongs to the set ∆
· (Zi )`i=1 defined by
(10)

2

∆
· (Zi )`i=1 = { [qz/z 0 ] ∈ [0, ∞]Z |
m
) 1 ∈ (qz σ,j /z j )m
(∀m)(∀σ)(∀(z j )j=0
j=0 } ,

in which m is a nonnegative integer, σ is a vector (σ1 , σ2 , ... σ` ) of
permutations of {0, 1, ... m}, each z j is a vector in the Cartesian product
`
Z = Πi=1
Zi , each z σ,j is the vector in Z defined by
σ (j)

σ (j)

σ (j)

z σ,j = (z1 1 , z2 2 , ... z` ` ) ,
m
and  is the function which assigns a subset of [0, ∞] to every (uj )j=0
in [0, ∞]1+m according to the rule


[0, ∞]
if (∃j)uj =0 and (∃j)uj =∞
j m
(u )j=0 =
j
otherwise
{Πm
j=0 u }

({1} is assigned to the empty vector). Streufert (2006a, Remark 3.2)
observes that every product is a dispersion (and hence “product” and
“product dispersion” are synonymous.)
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The marginals of a product [qz/z0 ] over (Zi )`i=1 are the ` dispersions
([qzi /zi0 ])`i=1 which satisfy
(∀z, z 0 ) qz/z0 ∈ (qzi /zi0 )`i=1 .
Streufert (2006a, Remark 4.1) shows that every product has a unique
vector of marginals, and that for any dimension i, the marginal [qzi /zi0 ]
satisfies
(11)

? /z 0 z ? ]
[qzi /zi0 ] = [qzi z−i
i −i

?
for any z−i
∈ Πj6=i Zj . Note that marginals are defined to be dispersions
(and hence “marginal” and “marginal dispersion” are synonymous).
The more leisurely discussion of producthood in Streufert (2005, Section 3) makes two general observations about producthood which might
bear repeating here. First, a product is defined to be a table over a
Cartesian product in which cancellations can occur in its different dimensions independently. In this regard, product dispersions are like
product distributions. Second, many different products can share the
same vector of marginals. In other words, a vector of marginal dispersions is ambiguous. In this regard, product dispersions are different
from product distributions (in my own experience, this is difficult to
remember).

3.4. Informal Introduction to Theorem
Streufert (2005, Sections 4 and 5) introduces this paper’s second
characterization of consistency in a simpler setting in which the only
nontrivial information set follows after two simultaneous moves. Accordingly, all but the bravest souls might like to get comfortable with
statement (b) in that paper’s Theorem 5.1 before venturing further.
In the present setting, consider the example and contemplate the
Cartesian product
(12)

W ×Πh Ah = {o}×{L, D, R}×{`, d}×{f, g} =

{ oL`g, oLdg, oD`g, oDdg, oR`g, oRdg,
oL`f, oLdf, oD`f, oDdf, oR`f, oRdf }

The following theorem is concerned with all the relative probabilities
among the 12 elements of this set. Hence it is concerned with a 144dimensional dispersion. One of these creatures is lurking in Figure 3.2.
Notice that its rows and columns are labelled with the elements of the
Cartesian product (12). For instance, Figure 3.2 says that qoD`f /oL`g =
2.

10

oRdg
oRdf
oR`g
oR`f
oDdg
oDdf
oD`g
oD`f
oLdg
oLdf
oL`g
oL`f
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0
0
0
0
∞
∞
.5
.5
∞
∞
1
1
oL`f

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
∞
∞
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
∞
∞
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
∞
.5
∞
∞
1
1
∞
∞
.5
∞
∞
∞
∞
∞
.5
.5
1
1
.5
0
0
1
1
0
0
∞
∞
.5
0
0
1
1
0
0
∞
∞
1
1
2
2
∞
∞
∞
∞
∞
∞
1
1
∞
∞
2
2
∞
∞
1
0
0
2
2
0
0
∞
∞
1
0
0
2
2
0
0
∞
∞
oL`g oLdf oLdg oD`f oD`g oDdf oDdg oR`f oR`g

1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
∞
∞
∞
∞
∞
∞
∞
∞
∞
∞
∞
∞
∞
∞
∞
∞
oRdf oRdg

Table 3.2

The “third” player’s strategy can be derived from this dispersion.
In particular, the “third” player chooses at the information set h =
{oLd, oD} among the options Ah = {f, g}. By (11), the marginal of
the dispersion with respect to Ah = {f, g} is


 
qoL`f /oL`g qoL`g/oL`g
1 1
,
=
[qoL`ah /oL`ah0 ] =
qoL`f /oL`f qoL`g/oL`f
1 1
and this marginal induces the strategy (πf , πg ) = (.5, .5). Note that
this 2×2 marginal appears in the bottom-left corner of Figure 3.2.
There was, by the way, nothing special about using oL` to find the
marginal with respect to {f, g}. We might have used oLd, oD`, oDd,
oR`, or oRd. The five corresponding 2×2 tables can be found along
the main diagonal in Figure 3.2. As expected from (11), they are all
equal.
The “second” player’s strategy can also be derived from this dispersion. In particular, the “second” player chooses at the information set
h = {oL} among the options Ah = {`, d}. By (11), the marginal with
respect to {`, d} is

 

∞ 1
qoL`f /oLdf qoLdf /oLdf
=
,
[qoLah f /oLa0h f ] =
qoL`f /oL`f qoLdf /oL`f
1 0
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and this induces the strategy (π` , πd ) = (1, 0). Note that this 2×2
marginal appears in the four corners of the 3×3 table in the bottomleft corner of Figure 3.2 (there are five equal 2×2 tables corresponding
to oL g, oD f , oD g, oR f , and oR g).
Finally, the “first” player’s strategy can also be derived from the
dispersion. In particular, the “first” player chooses at the information
set h = {o} among the options Ah = {L, D, R}. By (11), the marginal
with respect to {L, D, R} is

 

qoL`f /oR`f qoD`f /oR`f qoR`f /oR`f
0 0 1
[qoah `f /oa0h `f ] = qoL`f /oD`f qoD`f /oD`f qoR`f /oD`f  = .5 1 ∞ ,
qoL`f /oL`f qoD`f /oL`f qoR`f /oL`f
1 2 ∞

which induces the strategy (πL , πD , πR ) = (0, 0, 1). To find this 3×3
marginal within Figure 3.2, note the nine rectangles partitioning the
table and take the bottom left element from each of them (there are
three equal 3×3 tables corresponding to o `g, o df , and o dg).
It remains to find the belief at the third player’s information set
h = {oLd, oD}. We need two sets. The first is
SoLd = { w(aη )η | w = p`(oLd) (oLd) and

(∀`∈{0, 1, ... `(oLd)−1} aH◦p`+1 (oLd) = α◦p` (oLd) }

= { w(aη )η | w = p2 (oLd),

aH◦p2 (oLd) = α◦p1 (oLd), aH◦p1 (oLd) = α◦p0 (oLd) }

= { w(aη )η | w = o, aH(o) = α(oL), aH(oL) = α(oLd) }
= { w(aη )η | w = o, a{o} = L, a{oL} = d }

= {oLdf, oLdg} ,

which is the subset of the Cartesian product {o}×{L, D, R}×{`, d}×
{f, g} which is “compatible” with the node oLd. Similarly, the subset
of the Cartesian product which is “compatible” with oD is
SoD = { w(aη )η | w = p`(oD) (oD) and

(∀`∈{0, 1, ... `(oD)−1} aH◦p`+1 (oD) = α◦p` (oD) }

= { w(aη )η | w = p1 (oD), aH◦p1 (oD) = α◦p0 (oD) }

= { w(aη )η | w = o, aH(o) = α(oD) }

= { w(aη )η | w = o, a{o} = D }

= {oD`f, oD`g, oDdf, oDdg} .

12
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The union of these two sets,
SoLD ∪SoD = {oLdf, oLdg, oD`f, oD`g, oDdf, oDdg} ,

is comprised of those elements of the Cartesian product that might have
something to do with the belief at the information set h = {oLd, oD}.
Accordingly, consider the restriction of Figure 3.2 to (SoLd ∪SoD )2 .
This restriction is the 6×6 boxed table within Figure 3.2. This restriction induces the following distribution over SoLd ∪SoD
(13)

w(aη )η
νw(aη )η |SoLd ∪SoD

SoLd
SoD
oLdf oLdg oD`f oD`g oDdf oDdg
0
0
.5
.5
0
0

and this distribution implies that the belief over h = {oLd, oD} is
( νSoLd |SoLd ∪SoD , νSoD |SoLd ∪SoD ) = (0, 1) .

To summarize, the product dispersion in Figure 3.2 determines all the
strategies and all the beliefs. In particular, its marginals determine the
strategies and its restrictions determine the beliefs. Producthood plays
an essential role in these calculations by assuring that the marginals
are well-defined via (11).
Streufert (2005, Section 5.2) summarizes an example which illustrates that a strategy does not uniquely determine a marginal, and
further, that a profile of marginals does not uniquely determine a product. These two sources of ambiguity are the reasons that one strategy
profile can be consistent with many belief systems.
3.5. Formal Theorem
Consider any information set h. At any xh , define
(14)

Sxh = { w(aη )η ∈ W ×Πη Aη | w = p`(xh ) (xh ) and

(∀`∈{0, 1, ... `(xh )−1}) aH◦p`+1 (xh ) = α◦p` (xh ) } .

Then let [qw(aη )η /w0 (a0η )η ]|∪x0 Sx0 denote the restriction of the dispersion
h h
[qw(aη )η /w0 (a0η )η ] to ∪x0hSxh0 . This restriction induces a conditional distribution over ∪x0hSx0h which we will denote [νw(aη )η |∪x0 Sx0 ]. This condih h
tional distribution then determines the probability of each Sxh relative
to ∪x0hSx0h by
(15)

(∀xh ) νSxh |∪x0 Sx0 = Σw(aη )η ∈Sxh νw(aη )η |∪x0 Sx0
h

h

h

h

(the assumption of perfect recall guarantees that (Sxh )xh partitions
∪x0hSxh0 ).
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Theorem 3.1. In any game form [T, ≺, A, α, ρ, H], an assessment
([πah ])h , ([µxh ])h is consistent iff there exists a product [qw(ah )h /w0 (a0h )h ]
over (W, (Ah )h ) such that
(ρ, ([πah ])h ) is induced by the marginals of [qw(ah )h /w0 (a0h )h ] and
(∀h) [µxh ] is the [νSxh |∪x0 Sx0 ] induced by [qw(ah )h /w0 (a0h )h ]|∪x0 Sx0 .
h

h

Proof. Theorem 4.1(c⇔d).

h

h

2

The inspiration for this characterization can be traced to Kohlberg
and Reny (1997). In particular, a reformulation of its Theorem 2.10 is
equivalent to Streufert (2006a, Remark 6.3) (further discussion appears
there).
The above characterization is also related to an idea pursued by
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, Section 6). That paper considers the
equivalent of a dispersion on the set of terminal nodes. This differs
from the above characterization in two ways. First, it is more aggregated: the set of terminal nodes is relatively small and expands to the
Cartesian product W ×Πh Ah only in simultaneous-move games. Second, and much more importantly, dispersionhood is far weaker than
producthood, and producthood with its many cancellation laws corresponds to the KW definition of consistency (this is the underlying issue
identified by Kohlberg and Reny (1997) in their note 17).
I would suggest that product dispersions provide a comparatively
fundamental way of understanding consistency. Unlike the KW definition of consistency, it is uncluttered with arbitrary choices of sequences.
And, unlike Theorem 1’s characterization, it is uncluttered with arbitrary choices of coefficients and exponents.

4. General Theorem
4.1. A Third Characterization
Statement (a) in Theorem 4.1 provides a third characterization of
consistency. It is close to (b), which was discussed in Section 2 as the
first of this paper’s two characterizations. In fact, (b) is derived from
a convenient “normalization” of (a). Although relatively unimportant,
(a) does have some independent value as a sufficient condition for consistency when one would rather not be bothered with the normalization
inherent in (b).
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Statement (a) is also a focal point of the Theorem 4.1’s underlying
logic. At first glance, it is useful to notice that the theorem’s four equivalent statements are arranged so that all three “downhill” implications
are much easier than getting from (d) all the way back to (a). This difficult step is achieved via Streufert (2006a), whose Theorem 5.1 proves
that any product dispersion (such as [qw(ah )h /w0 (ah0 )h ]) can be represented
by some product of monomial vectors (such as [cw new Πh cah neah ]). Once
(a) has been attained, it is comparatively easy to find a “normalization” of the monomials which yields the relatively simple expressions of
(b). Then, another sort of “normalization” converts these expressions
into the strategy sequences defining consistency in (c).
Since the reader is probably familiar with the definition of consistency in (c), the proof starts at (c) and immediately proceeds to derive
(d)’s underlying product dispersion from the definition of consistency.
It then makes the leap to (a), drops to (b), and drops back to (c).
Theorem 4.1. Let [T, ≺, A, α, ρ, H] be a game form. Then the following four statements are equivalent for any assessment ([πah ], [µxh ])h .
(a) There exists a ([cah neah ])h such that
(∀h) [πah ] is induced by [cah neah ] and
(∀h) [µxh ] is induced by [Σw(aη )η ∈Sxh ρw Πη caη neaη ] .
(b) There exists a ([cah neah ])h such that
(∀h) [πah ] = limn→∞ [cah neah ] and
`(x )−1

(∀h) [µxh ] is induced by [ρp`(xh ) (xh ) ·Πk=0h

cα◦pk (xh ) neα◦pk (xh ) ] .

(c) (Consistency in KW) There exists a (h[πanh ]in )h such that
(∀h) [πah ] = limn→∞ [πanh ] and
`(x )−1 n
πα◦pk (xh ) ]

(∀h) [µxh ] is induced by [ρp`(xh ) (xh ) ·Πk=0h

.

(d) There exists a product [qw(ah )h /w0 (a0h )h ] over (W, (Ah )h ) such that
(ρ, ([πah ])h ) is induced by the marginals of [qw(ah )h /w0 (ah0 )h ] and
(∀h) [µxh ] is the [νSxh |∪x0 Sx0 ] induced by [qw(ah )h /w0 (ah0 )h ]|(∪x0 Sx0 )2 .
h

h

h

h

The word “induce” is littered throughout the theorem. In (a), (b),
and (c), a distribution is “induced” by a vector of functions of n according to definition (6). In (d), a distribution is “induced” by a finite
row in a dispersion according to definitions (9) and (15).
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4.2. Proof of Theorem 4.1(c⇒d)
The substantive matter here is that the sequences defining consistency in (c) imply the cancellation laws defining producthood in (d).
This matter is addressed in the first two paragraphs of Proof 4.4 below.
The remainder of the proof is concerned with translating from the
game-tree notation of (c) to the product notation of (d). This translation is facilitated by a definition and two lemmas. A table [qz/z0 ] is
said to be approximated by a sequence h[βzn ]in of positive vectors if
(16)

(∀z, z 0 ) qz/z0 = limn→∞ βzn /βzn0 .

Because this concept concerns ratios, the positive vectors [βzn ] need not
be normalized as full-support distributions. It is well understood that
the existence of an approximation is equivalent to dispersionhood (see
Streufert (2005, Note 7) for details).
Lemma 4.2. Suppose that h[βzn ]in approximates [qz/z0 ]. Then h[βzn ]in
induces exactly one distribution, [qz/z0 ] induces exactly one distribution,
and these two distributions are identical.
Proof. Streufert (2005, Remark 2.1) yields that [qz/z0 ] induces exactly
one distribution. This is one of the lemma’s three conclusions. Let
[νzQ ] denote this unique distribution, and note from the definition (9)
of inducement that there exists a z ∗ such that
(17a)

(∀z) νzQ = qz/z∗ /Σz0 qz0 /z∗ and

(17b)

(∀z 0 ) qz0 /z∗ < ∞ .

Then
(18)

qz/z∗
Σz0 qz0 /z∗
limn→∞ (βzn /βzn∗ )
limn→∞ (βzn /βzn∗ )
=2
=3
Σz0 limn→∞ (βzn0 /βzn∗ )
limn→∞ Σz0 (βzn0 /βzn∗ )
βzn
(βzn /βzn∗ )
=5 limn→∞
,
=4 limn→∞
Σz0 (βzn0 /βzn∗ )
Σz0 βzn0
(∀z) νzQ =1

where =1 holds by (17a), =2 holds by the lemma’s assumption of approximation and the definition (16), =3 holds by the algebra of limits
and (17), =4 holds by the algebra of limits and the fact that the denominator is at least βzn∗ /βzn∗ = 1, and =5 holds by algebra.
Equation (18) yields two conclusions. First, it shows that [νzQ ] is
induced by h[βzn ]in , and thus h[βzn ]in induces at least one distribution. Second, if [νzB ] is any distribution induced by h[βzn ]in , then [νzB ]
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must equal the right-hand side of (18), and hence, (18) yields that [νzB ]
equals [νzQ ], which is the unique distribution induced by [qz/z0 ]. Hence,
h[βzn ]in induces exactly one distribution, and that distribution equals
the unique distribution induced by [qz/z0 ].
2
`
Lemma 4.3. Suppose a product over (Zi )i=1
is approximated by a
`
n
sequence of the form h[Πi=1 βzi ]in . Then, for any i, its marginal with
respect to Zi is appoximated by h[βzni ]in .

Proof. Let [qz/z0 ] be the product approximated by h[Π`i=1 βzni ]in . Fix
any z ? , and consider any dimension i. First, (11) yields that the mar? /z 0 z ? ]. Second, since [qz z ? /z 0 z ? ]
ginal with respect to zi equals [qzi z−i
i −i i −i
i −i
is a restriction of [qz/z0 ], and since all of [qz/z0 ] is approximated by
n
? /z 0 z ? ] is approximated by h[β ](Πj6=i βz ? )i
h[Π`j=1 βznj ]in , we know [qzi z−i
zi
n
j
i −i
?
(remember that z−i
is fixed). These two sentences together yield that
the marginal with respect to zi is approximated by h[βzni ](Πj6=i βzj? )in .
Thus, since the definition (16) of approximation depends only on ratios, the marginal with respect to zi is also approximated by h[βzni ]in .
2
Proof 4.4 (for Theorem 4.1(c⇒d)). Assume (c). For any n, define
n
] over W ×Πh Ah by
the table [qw(a
0 0
h )h /w (a )h
h

(19)

n
=
(∀w(ah )h , w0 (a0h )h ) qw(a
0 0
h )h /w (ah )h

ρw Πh πanh
,
ρw0 Πh πan0
h

Notice that every such table is a product over (W, (Ah )h ) because the
table’s definition ensures that all of the cancellation laws in (10) are
satisfied by means of ordinary algebra (every relative probability is
positive and finite).
n
]i of such tables. This is
Now consider the sequence h[qw(a
0 0
h )h /w (ah )h n
a sequence in (|W |·Πh |Ah |)2 dimensions and there is no reason to believe that it will converge. However, the sequence lies in the space
of products over (W, (Ah )h ) (by the last sentence of the last paragraph) and the space of all products over (W, (Ah )h ) is compact (by
Streufert (2006a, Theorem 6.1)). Accordingly, a subsequence converges
m
to a product over (W, (Ah )h ). Let h[qw(a
]i denote the sub0 0
h )h /w (ah )h m
sequence, and let [qw(ah )h /w0 (ah0 )h ] denote its limit. Hence, by (19), we
have that h[ρw Πh πamh ]im approximates the product [qw(ah )h /w0 (a0h )h ].

First Half. By the previous sentence and Lemma 4.3, the marginal
dispersion of [qw(ah )h /w0 (a0h )h ] with respect to w is approximated by the
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constant sequence h[ρw ]im , and the marginal dispersion of this product
with respect to each ah is approximated by h[πamh ]im .
Note (rather easily) that [ρw ] is induced by the dispersion that is
approximated by the constant sequence h[ρw ]im . Since this dispersion
is the marginal with respect to w (by the previous paragraph), we have
that [ρw ] is induced by the marginal with respect to w. Now consider
any h. Since h[πamh ]im approximates the marginal with respect to ah
(by the previous paragraph) and since [πah ] is induced by h[πamh ]im (by
the first half of (c)), we have that [πah ] is induced by the marginal with
respect to ah (by Lemma 4.2). Thus the first half of (d) holds.
Second Half. Now consider any h. Define
(∀xh ) Nxh = { η | not (∃aη )(∃k∈{0, 1, ... `(xh )−1}) aη = α◦pk (xh ) }
(thus Nxh contains those information sets which are not reached on the
way to xh ). Note that
(20)

(∀xh )(∀m) Σ{Πη∈Nxhπamη |(aη )η∈Nxh } = 1

since [Πη∈Nxh πamη ] is an ordinary product distribution over Πη∈Nxh Aη
simply because every [πamη ] is a distribution over Aη . This leads to
`(x )−1 m
πα◦pk (xh )

(∀xh )(∀m) ρp`(xh ) (xh ) ·Πk=0h
(21)

`(x )−1 m
πα◦pk (xh ) ·Σ{Πη∈Nxhπamη |(aη )η∈Nxh }

=1 ρp`(xh ) (xh ) ·Πk=0h

`(x )−1 m
πα◦pk (xh ) ·Πη∈Nxhπamη |(aη )η∈Nxh }
=3 Σw(aη )η ∈Sxh pw Πη πamη ,

=2 Σ{ ρp`(xh ) (xh ) ·Πk=0h

where =1 holds by (20), =2 by algebra, and =3 by the definition (14)
of Sxh .
Since h[ρw Πh πxmh ]im approximates [qw(aη )η /w0 (aη0 )η ] (by the second paragraph of the proof), the restriction of the sequence to ∪x0hSx0h approximates the restriction of the dispersion to (∪x0hSx0h )2 . Hence, by
Lemma 4.2, we may let the left-hand side of (22) denote the unique
distribution induced by the restriction of the sequence to ∪x0hSx0h , let
right-hand side of (22) denote the unique distribution induced by the
restriction of the dispersion to (∪x0hSxh0 )2 , and record for future reference
that
(22)

(c)

[νw(aη )η |∪

(d)

x0 Sx0
h h

] = [νw(aη )η |∪

x0 Sx0
h h

].
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This paragraph uses (21) and (22) to derive the second half of (d).
In particular,
(∀xh ) µxh
`(x )−1 m
πα◦pk (xh )
=1 limm→∞
0
`(x )−1 m
Σxh0 ρp`(x0 ) (x0h ) Πk=0h πα◦p
0
k (xh )
h

ρp`(xh ) (xh ) Πk=0h

=2 limm→∞

Σw(aη )η ∈Sxh pw Πη πamη

Σxh0 Σw(aη )η ∈Sxh pw Πη πamη
pw Πη πamη
=3 limm→∞ Σw(aη )η ∈Sxh
Σw(aη )η ∈∪x0 Sx0 pw Πη πamη
h

=4 Σw(aη )η ∈Sxh limm→∞

h

pw Πη πamη
Σw(aη )η ∈∪x0 Sx0 pw Πη πamη
h

h

(c)
=5 Σw(aη )η ∈Sxh νw(aη )η |∪ 0 S 0
x
x
h

h

(d)
=6 Σw(aη )η ∈Sxh νw(aη )η |∪ 0 S 0
x
x
h

,

h

where =1 holds by the second half of (c), =2 holds by (21), =3 holds
by algebra, =4 holds by the algebra of limits and the fact that every
term being summed is less than one, =5 holds by the definition of
(c)
[νw(aη )η |∪ 0 S 0 ] above (22), and =6 holds by (22). By the definition of
x
x
h h

(d)
[νw(aη )η |∪ 0 S 0
x
x
h

] above (22) and by the definition of ν at (15), the entire

h

equality is the second half of (d).

2

4.3. Proof of Theorem 4.1(d⇒a)
This is the critical part of the proof. Its essential ingredient is
Streufert (2006a, Theorem 5.1), which shows that every product dispersion can be represented by a product of monomial vectors. This result
will be applied to [qw(ah )h /w0 (a0h )h ] in order to obtain [cw new ·Πh cah neah ].
In order to employ this theorem, we require a definition and two
lemmas. As in Streufert (2006a, equation (15)), a monomial vector
[cz nez ] represents the table [qz/z0 ] defined by


if ez > ez0
∞
ez
cz n
(23)
=  cz /cz0 if ez = ez0 
(∀z, z 0 ) qz/z0 = limn→∞
cz0 nez0
0
if ez < ez0
(the second equality is an obvious fact). It is well understood that
the existence of a representation is equivalent to dispersionhood (see
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Streufert (2005, Note 4) for details). The following lemma notes that
representation is invariant to monomial multiplication.
Lemma 4.5. For any monomial ξnε and any monomial vector [cz nez ],
the table represented by [cz nez ] equals the table represented by ξnε [cz nez ].
?
Proof. If [qz/z0 ] is represented by [cz nez ] and [qz/z
0 ] is represented by
ez
ε
ξn [cz n ], then (23) implies
0

(∀z, z ) q

z/z 0

cz nez
ξnε cz nez
?
= limn→∞
= limn→∞ ε ez = qz/z
0 .
e
z
cz n
ξn cz n
2

Lemma 4.6. Suppose [cz nez ] represents [qz/z0 ]. Then [cz nez ] induces
exactly one distribution, [qz/z0 ] induces exactly one distribution, and
these two distributions are identical.
Proof. Any [cz nez ] induces exactly one distribution because the limit
in the definition (6) of induction must exist when the functions of n are
monomials. Any [qz/z0 ] induces exactly one distribution by Streufert
(2005, Remark 2.1). Thus, if [cz nez ] represents [qz/z0 ], the induced
2
distributions are identical by Streufert (2005, Lemma 5.2).
Proof 4.7 (for Theorem 4.1(d⇒a)). Assume (d). By Theorem
5.1(b⇒a) of Streufert (2006a), the product [qw(ah )h /w0 (ah0 )h ] is represented by some [cw new ·Πh cah neah ]. Since representation is invariant to
monomial multiplication by Lemma 4.5, we may multiply this original
[cw new ·Πh cah neah ] by the monomial
(Σw∈argmax{eω |ω} cw )−1 n−max{eω |ω}

to arrive at a “normalized” [cw new ·Πh cah neah ] which both represents
[qw(ah )h /w0 (ah0 )h ] and satisfies
(24)

max{ew } = 0 and Σw {cw |ew =0} = 1 .

Further, by the second sentence of Streufert (2006a, Theorem 5.1), the
marginals of the product [qw(ah )h /w0 (a0h )h ] are represented by [cw new ] and
([cah neh ])h .
First Half. Consider any h. By the last sentence of the previous
paragraph, [cah neh ] represents the marginal with respect to ah . Thus,
by Lemma 4.6, the distribution induced by [cah neh ] equals the distribution induced by the marginal with respect to ah . The latter is [πah ] by
the first half of (d). Hence the former is [πah ] as well. In other words,
[πah ] is the distribution induced by [cah neh ]. This establishes the first
half of (a).
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Second Half. By the last sentence of the next-to-last paragraph,
[cw new ] represents the marginal with respect to w. Thus, by Lemma 4.6,
the distribution induced by [cw new ] equals the distribution induced by
the marginal with respect to w. The latter is [ρw ] by the first half
of (d). Hence, the former is [ρw ] as well. In other words, [ρw ] is the
distribution induced by [cw new ]. By the normalization (24) and the
assumption that [ρw ] has full support, it must be that
[ρw ] = [cw new ] .

(25)

Now consider any h. Since the monomial vector [cw new ·Πh cah neah ]
represents the product [qw(ah )h /w0 (ah0 )h ] (by the first paragraph), the restriction of the monomial vector to ∪x0hSx0h represents the restriction
of the product to (∪x0hSx0h )2 . Thus, by Lemma 4.6, we may let the
left-hand side of (26) denote the unique distribution induced by the restriction of the monomial vector, let the right-hand side of (26) denote
the unique distribution induced by the restriction of the product, and
record for future reference that
(d)

(a)

(26)

[νw(aη )η |∪

x0 Sx0
h h

] = [νw(aη )η |∪

x0 Sx0
h h

].

This paragraph uses (25) and (26) to derive the second half of (a).
In particular,
(∀xh )

µxh
(d)

=1 Σw(ah )h ∈Sxh νw(ah )h |∪

x0 Sx0
h h

(a)

=2 Σw(ah )h ∈Sxh νw(ah )h |∪

x0 Sx0
h h

=3 Σw(ah )h ∈Sxh limn→∞

cw new ·Πη caη neaη
e 0
Σw0 (ah0 )h ∈∪x0 Sx0 cw0 new0 ·Πη ca0η n aη
h

h

Σw(ah )h ∈Sxh cw n ·Πη caη neaη
ew

=4 limn→∞

ea 0

Σw0 (a0h )h ∈∪x0 Sx0 cw0 new0 ·Πη caη0 n

=5 limn→∞

η

h

h

Σw(ah )h ∈Sxh ρw ·Πη caη neaη

ea0

Σw0 (a0h )h ∈∪x0 Sx0 ρw0 ·Πη ca0η n
h

η

,

h

where =1 holds by the second sentence of (d), the definition of ν at (15)
(d)
and the definition of [νw(aη )η |∪ 0 S 0 ] above (26), =2 holds by (26), =3
x
x
h h

holds by definition of

(a)
[νw(aη )η |∪ 0 S 0
x
x
h

h

] above (26),=4 holds by the algebra

of limits and the fact that all the limits on the left-hand side are less
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than 1, and =5 holds by (25). The entire equality is the second half of
2
(a).
4.4. Proof of Theorem 4.1(a⇒b)
Essentially, this step simplifies (a)’s algebra to arrive at (b). The
trick is to use Lemma 4.8 to find a convenient “normalization” of the
monomial vectors ([cah neah ])h . Intuitively, this trick becomes clear in
the first two paragraphs of Proof 4.9. Unfortunately, the details are
taxing because the expressions determining beliefs have zero-limit denominators at every zero-probability information set.
Lemma 4.8. For any monomial ξnε and any monomial vector [cz nez ],
the distribution induced by [cz nez ] is the same as the distribution induced by ξnε [cz nez ].
Proof. Suppose [νz ] is induced by [cz nez ] and [νz? ] is induced by
ξnε [cz nez ]. Then by the definition (6) of inducement,
ξnε cz nez
cz nez
= limn→∞
= νz? .
(∀z) νz = limn→∞
Σz0 cz0 nez0
Σz0 ξnε cz0 nez0
2
Proof 4.9 (for Theorem 4.1(a⇒b)). Assume (a). Because induction
is invariant to monomial multiplication by Lemma 4.8, we may multiply
each original [cah neah ] by the monomial
−max{eah0 |ah0 }
(Σ{ cah | ah ∈ argmax{eah0 |ah0 } })−1 n

in order to arrive at a “normalized” ([cah neah ])h which satisfies both
halves of (a) as well as
(27a)

(∀h) max{eah |ah } = 0 and
(∀h) Σ{cah |eah =0} = 1 .

(27b)

First Half. The first half of (b) holds because
(28)

(∀ah )

πah
e

0

=1 limn→∞ cah neah /Σa0h ca0h n ah


cah /Σ{ca0h |ea0h =0} if eah =0
=2
0
if eah <0


cah if eah =0
=3
0 if eah <0
=4 limn→∞ cah neah ,

22

STREUFERT

where =1 holds by the first half of (a), =2 holds by (27a), =3 holds by
(27b), and =4 holds by (27a).
Second Half. Fix h. The first task is to set up a way of dealing with
zero-limit denominators: define
eh = max{ Ση eaη | w(aη )η ∈∪x0hSx0h } ,
and note that
(29a)
(29b)

(∀xh ) limn→∞ n−eh ·Σw(aη )η ∈Sxh ρw Πη caη neaη ∈ [0, ∞) and
(∃xh ) limn→∞ n−eh ·Σw(aη )η ∈Sxh ρw Πη caη neaη ∈ (0, ∞) .

Then, for any xh , define the set
(30)

Nxh = { η | not (∃aη )(∃k∈{0, 1, ... `(x)−1}) aη = α◦pk (x) }

(thus Nxh consists of the information sets through which one does not
pass on the way to node xh ). We can make two observations. First,
limn→∞ Σ{ Πη∈Nxh caη neaη | (aη )η∈Nxh }

(31)

=1 Σ{ Πη∈Nxh limn→∞ caη neaη | (aη )η∈Nxh }

=2 Σ{ Πη∈Nxh πxh | (aη )η∈Nxh }

=3 1 ,

where =1 holds by (28) and the algebra of limits, =2 holds by (28), and
=3 holds because Πη∈Nxh πxh is an ordinary product distribution over
the Cartesian product Πη∈Nxh Aη . Second,
(32)

(∀xh )

Σw(aη )η ∈Sxh ρw Πη caη neaη

=1 Σ{ ρw Πη caη neaη | w = p`(xh ) (xh ) and

(∀k∈{0, 1, ... `(xh )−1}) aH◦pk+1 (xh ) = α◦pk (xh ) }
`(x )−1

=2 Σ{ ρp`(xh ) (xh ) ·Πk=0h
| (aη )η∈Nxh }

`(x )−1

=3 ρp`(xh ) (xh ) ·Πk=0h

cα◦pk (xh ) neα◦pk (xh ) ·Πη∈Nxh caη neaη

cα◦pk (xh ) neα◦pk (xh ) ·

Σ{ Πη∈Nxh caη neaη | (aη )η∈Nxh } .

where =1 holds by the definition (14) of Sxh , =2 holds by the definition
(30) of Nxh , and =3 holds by algebra.
This paragraph uses (31) and (32) to derive the second half of (b).
It takes two steps. First,
(33)

(∀xh ) limn→∞ n−eh ·Σw(aη )η ∈Sxh ρw Πη caη neaη

CONSISTENCY

23

`(x)−1

=1 limn→∞ n−eh ·ρp`(x) (x) ·Πk=0 cα◦pk (x) neα◦pk (x) ·
Σ{ Πη∈Nxh caη neaη | (aη )η∈Nxh }
`(x)−1

=2 limn→∞ n−eh ·ρp`(x) (x) ·Πk=0 cα◦pk (x) neα◦pk (x) ·
limn→∞ Σ{ Πη∈Nxh caη neaη | (aη )η∈Nxh }
`(x)−1

=3 limn→∞ n−eh ·ρp`(x) (x) ·Πk=0 cα◦pk (x) neα◦pk (x) ,
where =1 holds by (32), =2 holds (29a), (31), and the algebra of limits,
and =3 holds by (31). Second,
(∀xh ) µxh
Σw(aη )η ∈Sxh ρw Πη caη neaη
=1 limn→∞
Σw(aη )η ∈∪x0 Sx0 ρw Πη caη neaη
h

=2 limn→∞

h

·Σw(aη )η ∈Sxh ρw Πη caη neaη
n−eh ·Σw(aη )η ∈Sx0 ρw Πη caη neaη

−eh

n
Σx0h

h

=3

limn→∞ n−eh ·Σw(aη )η ∈Sxh ρw Πη caη neaη
Σx0h limn→∞ n−eh ·Σw(aη )η ∈Sx0 ρw Πη caη neaη

=4

`(x )−1
limn→∞ n−eh ·ρp`(xh ) (xh ) ·Πk=0h cα◦pk (xh ) neα◦pk (xh )
e
`(x0 )−1
0
Σx0h limn→∞ n−eh ·ρp`(x0 ) (xh0 ) ·Πk=0h cα◦pk (x0h ) n α◦pk (xh )

h

h

`(x )−1

=5 limn→∞

n−eh ·ρp`(xh ) (xh ) ·Πk=0h

cα◦pk (xh ) neα◦pk (xh )

`(x0 )−1

Σxh0 n−eh ·ρp`(x0 ) (x0h ) ·Πk=0h
h

eα◦p

cα◦pk (xh0 ) n

0
k (xh )

`(x )−1
ρp`(xh ) (xh ) ·Πk=0h cα◦pk (xh ) neα◦pk (xh )
=6 limn→∞
e
`(x0 )−1
0
Σxh0 ρp`(x0 ) (x0h ) ·Πk=0h cα◦pk (xh0 ) n α◦pk (xh )
h

where =1 is the first half of (a), =2 follows from algebra, =3 follows
from (29) and the algebra of limits, =4 follows from (33), =5 follows
from (29), (33) and the algebra of limits, and =6 follows by algebra.
The entire equality is the second half of (b).
2
4.5. Proof of Theorem 4.1(b⇒c)
This step transforms each monomial vector [cxh nexh ] into a strategy
e 0
sequence h[πanh ]in = h[cah neah ](Σah0 cah0 n ah )−1 in . Intuitively, this is clear:
e 0
at each n, the divisor Σa0h ca0h n ah normalizes the vector so that it sums
to one. Unfortunately, the details are nontrivial since the normalizing
divisors must be carried into the expressions determining beliefs, and
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such expressions have zero-limit denominators at every zero-probability
information set.
Proof 4.10 (for Theorem 4.1(b⇒c)). Assume (b). Define (h[πxnh ]in )h
by
ex0

(∀h)(∀n) [πxnh ] = [cxh nexh ]·(Σx0h cxh0 n

(34)

h

)−1 .

First Half. Note
(∀h) limn→∞ Σah cah neah

(35)

=1 Σah limn→∞ cah neah
=2 Σxh πah
=3 1 ,
where =1 holds by the first half of (b) and the algebra of limits, =2
holds by the first half of (b), and =3 holds by the well-definition of π.
Then
(36)

(∀h) [πah ]
=1 limn→∞ [cah neah ]
=2 limn→∞ [cah neah ](limn→∞ Σxh0 cx0h n
ex0

=3 limn→∞ [cah neah ](Σx0h cx0h n

h

ex0

h

)−1

)−1

=4 limn→∞ [πanh ] ,
where =1 holds by the first half of (b), =2 holds by (35), =3 holds by
the first half of (b), (35) and the algebra of limits, and =4 holds by the
definition (34) of h[πanh ]in .
Second Half. Fix h. Define

`(x )−1

eh = max{ Σk=0h

eα◦pk (xh ) | xh } ,

and note that
(37a)
(37b)

`(x )−1

(∀xh ) limn→∞ n−eh ·Πk=0h

cα◦pk (xh ) neα◦pk (xh ) ∈ [0, ∞) and

`(x )−1

(∃xh ) limn→∞ n−eh ·Πk=0h

cα◦pk (xh ) neα◦pk (xh ) ∈ (0, ∞) .

Further, for each xh , define Yxh by
Yxh = { η | (∃aη )(∃k∈{0, 1, ... `(x)−1}) aη = α◦pk (xh ) }
(thus Yxh is the set of information sets that are passed through on the
way to xh .) Note that
(38)

`(x )−1

(∀xh ) limn→∞ n−eh ·ρp`(xh ) (xh ) ·Πk=0h

cα◦pk (xh ) neα◦pk (xh )
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`(x )−1

=1

limn→∞ n−eh ·ρp`(xh ) (xh ) ·Πk=0h

cα◦pk (xh ) neα◦pk (xh )

Πη∈Yxh limn→∞ Σaη caη neaη
`(x )−1

n−eh ·ρp`(xh ) (xh ) ·Πk=0h

=2 limn→∞

cα◦pk (xh ) neα◦pk (xh )

Πη∈Yxh Σaη caη neaη
`(x )−1 n
πα◦pk (xh )

=3 limn→∞ n−eh ·ρp`(xh ) (xh ) ·Πk=0h

,

where =1 holds by (35), =2 holds by (35), (37a), and the algebra of
limits, and =3 holds by algebra and (34). Then
(∀xh ) µxh
`(x )−1

=1 limn→∞

ρp`(xh ) (xh ) ·Πk=0h

cα◦pk (xh ) neα◦pk (xh )

`(x0 )−1

Σxh0 ρp`(x0 ) (x0h ) ·Πk=0h
h

=2 limn→∞

−eh

n

eα◦p

cα◦pk (xh0 ) n

`(x )−1

·ρp`(xh ) (xh ) ·Πk=0h

cα◦pk (xh ) neα◦pk (xh )

`(x0 )−1

Σxh0 n−eh ·ρp`(x0 ) (x0h ) ·Πk=0h
h

=3

−eh

limn→∞ n

`(x )−1

·ρp`(xh ) (xh ) ·Πk=0h
h

=4

eα◦p

cα◦pk (xh0 ) n

0
k (xh )

cα◦pk (xh ) neα◦pk (xh )

`(x0 )−1

Σx0h limn→∞ n−eh ·ρp`(x0 ) (xh0 ) ·Πk=0h

0
k (xh )

eα◦p

cα◦pk (x0h ) n

0
k (xh )

`(x )−1 n
πα◦pk (xh )
`(x )−1 n
limn→∞ n−eh ·ρp`(x0 ) (xh0 ) ·Πk=0h πα◦p
0
k (xh )
h

limn→∞ n−eh ·ρp`(xh ) (xh ) ·Πk=0h
Σx0h

=5 limn→∞

=6 limn→∞

`(x )−1 n
πα◦pk (xh )
`(x )−1 n
n−eh ·ρp`(x0 ) (x0h ) ·Πk=0h πα◦p
0
k (xh )
h

n−eh ·ρp`(xh ) (xh ) ·Πk=0h
Σxh0

`(x )−1 n
πα◦pk (xh )
`(x )−1 n
ρp`(x0 ) (x0h ) ·Πk=0h πα◦p
0
k (xh )
h

ρp`(xh ) (xh ) ·Πk=0h
Σxh0

,

,

where =1 holds by the second half of (b), =2 holds by algebra, =3 holds
by (37) and the algebra of limits, =4 holds by (38), =5 holds (37), (38)
and the algebra of limits, and =6 holds by algebra. The entire equality
is the second half of (c).
2
Appendix A. Real Exponents
Throughout the paper, the symbol e assumes integer values, and accordingly, Theorem 2.1 and Theorem 4.1(a&b) are concerned with characterizing consistency by means of integer exponents. This appendix
notes that this paper’s results for integer exponents are stronger than
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analogous results for real exponents. In particular, Corollary A.1 follows from Theorem 4.1 and two components of its proof. Here ([ėah ])h
lists a vector [ėah ] of real exponents ėah ∈ R at every information set
h.
Corollary A.1. Let [T, ≺, A, α, ρ, H] be a game form. Then the
following are equivalent for any assessment ([µxh ], [πah ])h . (ȧ) There
exists a ([cah nėah ])h such that
(∀h) [πah ] is induced by [cah nėah ] and
(∀h) [µxh ] is induced by Σw(ah )h ∈Sxh ρw Πh cah nėah .
(ḃ) There exists a ([cah nėah ])h such that
(∀h) [πah ] = limn→∞ [cah nėah ] and
`(x )−1

(∀h) [µxh ] is induced by [ρ`(xh ) ·Πk=0h

cα◦pn (xh ) nėα◦pn (xh ) ] .

(c) ([πxh ], [µxh ])h is consistent.
Proof. As with Theorem 4.1, the downhill implications are relatively
easy. (ȧ) implies (ḃ) by Proof 4.9 after replacing (a) with (ȧ), (b) with
(ḃ), and e with ė. Then, (ḃ) implies (c) by Proof 4.10 after replacing
(b) with (ḃ) and e with ė.
(c) implies (ȧ) via two steps. First, (c) implies statement (a) of
Theorem 4.1 by Theorem 4.1 (this is the hard part). Second, this (a)
implies (ȧ) since the existence of monomials with integer coefficients
implies the existence of monomials with real coefficients.
2
Theorem 4.1(a⇔b⇔c) is strictly stronger than Corollary A.1 to the
extent that (a) is strictly stronger than (ȧ) and to the extent that (b)
is strictly stronger than (ḃ). In other words, Corollary A.1 derives
the existence of real, but not necessarily integer, exponents. Corollary A.1(ḃ⇔c) appears to be equivalent to a reformulation of Theorem 3.1 in Perea y Monsuwe, Jansen, and Peters (1997).
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